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cannot suppose that actual necessity impelled a woman living under the roof of the Crassus who was surnamed Dives, to sue for such meager personalty as could have been carried off or destroyed in a riot. We shall best understand the case as an attack on Gaius' enemies, directed by one to whom fine distinctions and forced interpretations were no new thing (cf. *De Leg.* ii. 53; Gellius 17, 7, 3). It qualifies our ideas of the orgy of violent repression, in which we are told Opimius indulged after the slaughter on the Aventine to know that the ordinary processes of law might be instituted against the victors, and that the pontifex maximus, as iudex in a private case, did not hesitate to defy the resentment of a party, already impatient of his precision, (cf. *Plut. Tib. Gr.* 19, 3; *Val. Max.* 3, 2, 17) by a strained application of a rule of law.

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### NOTES ON JUVENAL

In the *Classical Review*, XXVI, 22, Professor Paul Nixon briefly discusses Juvenal 7. 127-28 and 8. 4-5. In both passages, he says, Juvenal is really seeking to draw a picture of grandeur, of wealth and high position; into both passages he injects incongruous elements, by introducing epithets which suggest rather dilapidation: *curvatum*, *lusca*, *dimidios umerosque minorem*. In both passages, then, Juvenal to some extent defeats his own intentions; "In neither case is the poet able to refrain from irrelevant sarcasm." I am not so sure that the sarcasm is irrelevant; in both cases the satirist is having his fling at the same point, that in the estimation of the general any appearance of gentility, however sorry, has weight.

But I prefer for the moment to accept Professor Nixon's point of view, and to cite some other passages of Juvenal more or less akin. In the third Satire Juvenal is arguing with might and main that there is no place in Rome for an honorable poor man. Examine now carefully 46-48:

me nemo ministro  
fur erit atque ideo nulli comes exeo, tamquam  
mancus et exstinctae corpus non utile dextrae.

The satirist implies that every provincial governor and every *comes* of such a governor is a *fur*: hence he himself will never be *comes* of a governor. All this occurs in a lamentation of the difficulty of getting on at Rome! Hence it is clear that Juvenal is saying in effect, most illogically, "I am an honorable man and so I never get a chance—confound it—at dishonorable gains!

In l. 139-40 we have

Nullus iam parasitus erit! Sed quis ferat istas  
luxuriae sordes?

*parasitus* is a fine *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for *cliens* (cf. 126–38, and especially the mention of *clientes* in 132; in 132–34 throughout *clientes* is subject). Now, Juvenal in *Nullus iam parasitus erit!* is dealing with a grievous calamity. But, since he is repeatedly a sophisticated rhetorician lost in the exuberance of his own verbosity, or, to paraphrase Friedlander's admirable account, in his *Einleitung*, 48–50, has extraordinary tangential capacity, he passes at once to *Sed quis . . . sordes*, with its very different tone. The whole passage, then, runs thus: "Soon, oh woe of woes, there will be no parasite (client)!—But thank the gods for that! no one could stand being a parasite (client)!"

It goes without saying, however, that Juvenal is not alone in allowing incongruous elements to slip into his verses. There are striking instances, for example, in Seneca's *Medea*: see my note on Seneca's *Medea* 350–60 in the *Classical Review*, XVII, 46. I noted there also that in writing *regio deserta siti* in *Aen.* IV. 42 Vergil had allowed his narrative instinct to betray him into introducing something out of place in his catalogue of the difficulties and dangers besetting Dido's realm, and that *soporiferum*, the epithet of *papaver* in *Aen.* IV. 486, falls under the same general category.

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# ON ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* vii. 7. 1149 b 31 ff.

The accepted text reads:

διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτε ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιμ (τι?) ὄλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμὸν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

I think that the context here requires us to read οὐδὲ ἐξέστηκε for ἀλλά. But whether I am right or not in that conjecture, there are difficulties in the passage which the accepted interpretations only gloss over.

Aristotle is demonstrating that ἀκόλαστος and σώφρων do not, in the proper sense of the words, apply to animals. The γὰρ clause gives the reason, and has as Andronicus Rhodius saw, no reference, of course, to the virtual parenthesis ἀλλ' ἢ . . . εἶναι, which may therefore be provisionally ignored. The grounds, to anticipate, are briefly two: animals neither (1) possess deliberation nor reason, nor (2) can they even be spoken of as beside themselves or out of their (natural) wits like madmen. This reading yields the sense required by the context, and is subject to only slight objections, which will be explained away in the sequel. The received text sounds plausible, but is really impossible, I think. I see but one way to defend it. We may assume that γὰρ does after all refer in very elliptical fashion to the clause ἀλλ' ἢ . . . εἶναι. The meaning then would be that exceptionally lewd or voracious animals may be metaphorically spoken of as ἀκόλαστα like madmen, because they do not possess reason but have